Abbas Araghchi: Foreign Minister

Araghchi moved swiftly through his diplomatic training and became a desk officer within the Foreign Ministry. While working in this position, he earned a degree in politics, government, and foreign policy at the ministry’s School of International Relations. In 1991, he received a master’s degree in political science from Islamic Azad University in Tehran, a university with close ties to the IRGC. This enabled him to rise to Deputy Director of the ministry’s Department of Islamic and Regional Organizations. He was simultaneously involved in the resumption of diplomatic ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and represented Tehran in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

Araghchi’s rapid ascent through the Foreign Ministry and command of the English language enabled him to pursue doctoral research in the United Kingdom beginning in 1993. Under the supervision of Professor David McLellan, a British scholar of Marxism, Araghchi attained a PhD in politics from the University of Kent in 1996. This interlude in the UK provided credibility to Araghchi throughout his later career, with international media lauding his Western education – much like Zarif. This has largely served to obfuscate his extensive and secretive service within the QF and has been seen in a positive light by Western diplomats.

Upon returning to his post at the Foreign Ministry, Araghchi was promoted to serve as the head of the Center for Persian Gulf Studies, honing his knowledge of Iran’s neighboring Arab states. A year later, he was appointed Deputy Director General for Research within the Institute for International and Political Studies. Through his experience in these various low and mid-level research positions, Araghchi sharpened his understanding of the Foreign Ministry’s role within regime politics. In his words, the ministry’s primary role is to be the “executor” of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) – a body dominated by Khamenei and his appointees. It is the responsibility of the foreign minister to adopt the most effective approach for advancing the SNSC’s agenda. Between 1998-1999, Araghchi was appointed as head of the Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS), which operates as the Iranian Foreign Ministry (MFA)’s “think-tank”. IPIS has been at center of the creation, development, and deployment of various Iranian regime influence operations, including the so-called Iran Experts Initiative that was established in 2014 to infiltrate Western institutions.

Despite working in research positions, Aragchi was identified by his superiors as a strong candidate for foreign missions – a situation he describes as somewhat unusual. His mission experience enabled him to pivot into more senior positions, starting with his appointment as ambassador to Finland and Estonia in 1999. Building from his time in England, this appointment enabled Araghchi to gain valuable experience fostering personal relationships with European diplomats.

In 2003, Araghchi was recalled to Tehran and promoted to director of the Foreign Ministry’s Western Europe Department. While he served in this role, the Islamic Republic and the European Union brokered agreements seeking to constrain the regime’s nuclear program. This marked the beginning of Araghchi’s primary career focus of securing sanctions relief, even as the regime fails to deliver on its promises. Though these talks ultimately did not prevent the imposition of additional international sanctions, they provided a model for Araghchi’s approach to the JCPOA a decade later.

Araghchi returned to the Foreign Ministry’s School of International Relations in 2005, becoming its director. In this capacity, he also delivered lectures to diplomats-in-training, seeking to directly shape their understanding of foreign policy. As an affiliate of the QF, Araghchi’s goal was to develop a “school of thought” within international relations that centers support for the regime’s terrorist proxies, and trains his students within this framework. Illustrating his philosophy toward training the regime’s diplomats, he stated that though “the missions and appearance (of the IRGC and Foreign Ministry) may be different, their goal is the same.” 

Araghchi’s time in this academic space enabled him to hone his approach into “resistance diplomacy,” a doctrine emphasizing both the pursuit of sanctions relief and support for the regime’s proxies. Araghchi’s perspectives toward the regime’s diplomacy differs from the more outwardly belligerent approach taken by hardliners like Ebrahim Raisi or Saeed Jalili. In contrast with these figures, Araghchi has stressed the importance of dialogue, following diplomatic protocols, and developing personal relationships with Western officials, arguing that this approach is more effective at securing concessions for the regime. In recent statements, he has indicated that this doctrine will define his approach as foreign minister.

After spending two years as director of the School of International Relations, Araghchi was appointed deputy foreign minister for International and Legal Affairs during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In 2007, Jalili was appointed as head nuclear negotiator. Though Araghchi and Jalili had a personal relationship (even travelling on a pilgrimage together), Araghchi disapproved of Jalili’s approach as a negotiator, at times writing reports to Khamenei’s advisors detailing his poor performance – as revealed during the 2013 election.

Failing to work well with Ahmadinejad’s appointees, Araghchi was sidelined within the Foreign Ministry. Shortly after Jalili’s appointment, Araghchi was sent to Tokyo as the regime’s ambassador to Japan. While there, he sought to be an effective apologist for the Islamic Republic, frequently appearing in Japanese media and presenting himself as an apolitical pragmatist. He also lectured at Japanese universities, including the University of Tokyo. Upon his return to Tehran in 2013, he was named deputy foreign minister for Asia-Pacific and Central Asian Affairs.

Though Araghchi has been described as a “pragmatist” and a “moderate” since his appointment as foreign minister, these traits are superficial in nature. Despite his polished style, UK education, and personal relationship with European diplomats, Araghchi is a QF affiliate, and a beneficiary of Khamenei’s patronage – much like his supposed political rivals in the hardline camp. This combination of factors positions him to seek sanctions relief and divide the U.S. and Europe on the issue of nuclear negotiations (both policies he intends to pursue) without the eccentricity of figures like Zarif. The appointment of Araghchi in Pezeshkian’s administration also indicates Khamenei’s intent to expand his dual foreign policy approach, simultaneously using militancy and diplomacy to secure the regime’s interests. This is something Araghchi himself has openly confirmed, stating that during his tenure there will be “full coordination with the armed forces because the battlefield is complementary to diplomacy [and vice versa] in order to secure the regime’s “full interests.” Therefore, Western policymakers must approach Araghchi with caution – especially due his deep ties to the IRGC and continued QF affiliation.