IRGC Campaign

 

The purpose of the IRGC Campaign is to identify companies and entities that are owned, operated, or controlled by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and to highlight relationships between these entities and multinational corporations.

The IRGC is the driving ideological, security and military force behind the Iranian regime. The IRGC serves as caretaker of Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs and is the key instrument used to suppress Iran’s internal pro-democracy movement. The IRGC’s elite Qods Force plans terrorist attacks worldwide and provides support to insurgents responsible for killing American and NATO troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.

With support from then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the IRGC has assumed a dominant role in the Iranian economy. The IRGC now largely controls the petrochemical, banking, construction, and telecommunications sectors in Iran. Analysts estimate that the IRGC controls up to one-third of Iran’s economy, including businesses worth a combined $28 billion and 15 to 25 percent of the Iranian stock market.

The IRGC exercises much of its economic control through bonyads, tax-exempt, government subsidized foundations that control large swaths of Iranian industry, and IRGC-owned companies like Khatam al-Anbia, an engineering firm that is one of Iran's leading industrial contractors. Through Khatam al-Anbia, the IRGC has succeeded in assuming a dominant role in Iran’s oil and gas industry.

Many multinationals have done and, in some cases, continue to do business with IRGC-controlled entities, including European and Japanese automotive manufacturers Citroen, Renault, Nissan, Peugeot, Volvo, Fiat, Mazda, Isuzu, and Yamaha. South African telecommunications firm MTN is also in direct partnership with the IRGC-controlled Iran Electronics Industries.

In 2007 the United States government sanctioned both the IRGC and the Qods Force for their role in Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs, and acts of terrorism, respectively. In 2019, the U.S. designated the IRGC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Many IRGC-owned or controlled companies have also been blacklisted by the U.S., European Union, other concerned governments, and the United Nations.

In 2015, the U.N. Security Council, in accord with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, commonly called the Iran nuclear deal), terminated all of its nuclear-related Iran sanctions by adopting Resolution 2231. However, until October 18, 2025, all terminated sanctions may be reinstituted (so-called “snapback”). If a party to the JCPOA complains that Iran is not in compliance with the JCPOA, a dispute-resolution process would be triggered. If that process does not resolve the complaint within 35 days, The Council would have 30 days to vote to continue not applying the sanctions, or all U.N. sanctions would be “snapped back” into effect. At least nine Council members would have to vote in favor of non-application, and any of the Council’s five permanent members—the U.S., the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China—could veto the resolution. Snapped-back sanctions would not apply retroactively.

In the charts below, the * symbol indicates that the EU has suspended the application of sanctions against these companies, but has not terminated the sanctions completely (the JCPOA requires the EU to terminate sanctions against many of these firms at later dates, provided that the deal remains in effect). The EU would likely resume implementing these sanctions in the event of snapback by the U.N. Security Council.

 

Construction / Engineering / Industry

Company

U.S.

U.N.

EU

Khatam al-Anbia, aka GHORB, aka KAA: Serves as the IRGC's engineering arm and primary means of hijacking the Iranian economy. By some estimates, KAA has grown into Iran's largest company: its 812 subsidiaries employ approximately 40,000 people and have won over 17,000 no-bid contracts, primarily in the energy sector. KAA is heavily involved in construction of the Qom/Fordow facilities.

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Fater Engineering Institute: KAA subsidiary.

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Gharargahe Sazandegi Ghaem: Acquired tunnel-building equipment and expertise from European firms such as Wirth, and Seli, owned, controlled or acting on behalf of KAA.

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Ghorb Karbala: Owned by KAA.

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Ghorb Nooh: Controlled by KAA.

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Hara Company: Owned by Ghorb Nooh.

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Imensazen Consultant Engineers Institute: Subsidiary of KAA.

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Makin Institute: Subsidiary of KAA.

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Omran Sahel: Owned or controlled by KAA

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Oriental Oil Kish. Operated by KAA. Partially owned by the family of the late former Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani, notorious for threatening the incineration of Israel by nuclear weapons. [AG1] Once involved in a $310 million oil field–development contract with Halliburton.

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Rahab Institute: Subsidiary of KAA

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Rah Sahel: Owned or controlled by, or acting on behalf of, KAA.

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Tehran Gostaresh Company, PJS: General contractor owned or controlled by Bonyad Taavon Sepah. Reportedly collaborated with KAA, Bank Melli, and Iran’s Ministry of Roads and Transportation on one of Iran’s largest road construction projects.

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SADRA, aka Iran Marine Industrial Company: Naval-industrial giant 51.18% controlled by the KAA and IRGC. Builds ships, docks, and floating oil rigs, and has been awarded huge government contracts and assistance since IRGC takeover.

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Deep Offshore Technology Company PJS: Owned by SADRA; services offshore installation projects.

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Sahel Consultant Engineers: Owned by Ghorb Nooh.

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Sepanir Oil and Gas Engineering Company: Subsidiary of KAA. Participates in Iran's South Pars offshore gas field development.

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Sepasad Engineering Company: Owned by KAA. Specializes in earth and concrete dam construction, road construction, and tunneling.

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Industrial Development and Renovation Organization, aka IDRO: Government body responsible for acceleration of Iran's industrialization. Controls various companies involved in work for the nuclear and missile programs and involved in the foreign procurement of advanced manufacturing technology in order to support them. Former IRGC commander, former KAA head, and U.S.- and EU-sanctioned Rostam Ghasemi holds a position on the IDRO board of directors.

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Arvandan Shipbuilding Company: Subsidiary of IDRO. Builds high-speed patrol boats for the government of Iran.

 

 

 

Iran Khodro Group: Subsidiary of IDRO. Agreed with Peugeot to build a joint factory in Iran, but Peugeot began exiting Iran in 2018 after the U.S. reimposed sanctions. Produced over 690,000 vehicles in 2014–2015.

 

 

 

Iran Shipbuilding & Offshore Industries Complex, aka ISOICO: Performs ship-building and maritime construction. Subsidiary of IDRO.

 

 

 

Machine Sazi Pars Co: Designs, manufactures, and installs petrochemical-related machinery. Subsidiary of IDRO. Listed by the German Government as an entity of concern for military procurement activities.

 

 

 

Paysaz: Acquired by IDRO in 2005. Involved in oil-industry construction.

 

 

 

Saipa Group: Automaker subsidiary of IDRO. Has license-built models and/or otherwise collaborated with foreign auto companies, including Citroen, Renault, Nissan, Volvo, Iveco (Fiat), Kia, and BMW Brillianc.  

 

 

 

Bahman Group: Tehran-based manufacturing conglomerate 45.5% owned by the IRGC Cooperative Foundation until 2016. Has license-builded or currently license-builds Mazda, Borgward, FAW, and Haval vehicles and distributed Isuzu and Maxus ones.

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Bahman Diesel Co: Subsidiary of the Bahman Group. Manufactures truck and bus parts. Assembles and distributes, or has assembled and distributed, Isuzu trucks.

 

 

 

Bahman Motor Center: Subsidiary of Bahman Group. Manufacturing and assembly of vehicles, including Mazdas, Borgwards and Havals.

 

 

 

Iran Docharkh Co: Subsidiary of the Bahman Group. Handles imports, manufacturing and research for the Bahman Group, and builds Yamaha motorcycles.

 

 

 

Iran Zinc Mines Development Company: Subsidiary of the IRGC-controlled Mehr-E Eghtesad Iranian Investment Company.

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Angouran Mine: Bought by the Iran Zinc Mines Development Company for an estimated 20% of market value. The bidding process involved only three companies, all highly interconnected and IRGC-affiliated.

 

 

 

National Iranian Oil Engineering and Construction Company (NIOEC): Subsidiary of NIORDC.

 

 

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Passive Defense Organization (PDO): Selects and constructs strategic facilities, including Iran’s illicitly  and secretly built Fordow uranium-enrichment site. PDO’s chairman is former IRGC Brigadier General Gholam-Reza Jalali.

 

 

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Maher Trading and Construction Company: Lebanon-based firm owned or controlled by IRGC-QF official Hasan Dehghan Ebrahimi.

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Tejarat Almas Mobin Holding: Controlled by Mahmoud Seif, who collaborated with Rayan Printing on procurement of raw supplies and equipment for Rayan’s counterfeiting or Yemeni currency for the IRGC-QF. Seif has also previously been involved in procuring arms for the IRGC-QF.

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Pardavesh Tasvir Rayan Co., aka Rayan Printing: Owned by Tejarat Almas Mobin Holding. Counterfeited Yemeni currency worth up to hundreds of millions of dollars for the IRGC-QF.

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Oil Supply Chain

Company

U.S.

U.N.

EU

National Iranian Oil Company, aka NIOC: Petrochemical giant responsible for all operations associated with crude oil and gas explorations and production. Carries out research and oilfield-development projects and operates numerous subsidiaries. State-owned and formerly operated by former IRGC commander, former KAA head, and U.S. and EU-sanctioned Rostam Ghasemi as part of the IRGC's takeover of the Iranian energy industry. Has provided support to the IRGC and awarded contracts to KAA.

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Arvandan Oil & Gas Company: NIOC subsidiary. Reportedly operates oil and gas production for the Azadegan, Yadavaran, Darquain, Jufeyr, Moshtagh, Khorramshahr, Arvand, Susangerd, Band-e-Karkheh, Omid, and other oilfields located west of the Karun River.

  

 

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Iran Helicopter Support and Renewal Industries (PANHA): Leading Iranian helicopter maintenance and manufacturer, and has built and overhauled helicopters, including U.S.-origin ones, for Iran’s military and IRGC.

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National Iranian Oil Products Distribution Company (NIOPDC): Component of NIORDC. Has been responsible for over 2850 fuel stations, 45 aviation fuelling centers, and the distribution of over 220 million liters of oil products per day all over the country.

  

 

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National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC): Responsible for transporting 53 million tons of crude oil, NITC ranks as the world's fourth largest tanker fleet. Former subsidiary of NIOC, now privatized but with reported links to the IRGC-controlled oil supply chain.

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National Oil Pipeline and Telecommunications Company (IOPTC): Component of NIORDC, responsible for pipeline management and telecommunications services.

  

 

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National Oil Refining and Distribution Company (NIORDC): Component of NIOC and the Ministry of Petroleum, responsible for refining and distribution activities related to crude oil and petroleum products.

  

 

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North Drilling Company: Subsidiary of NIOC. Involved in offshore drilling projects.

  

 

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Petropars: Subsidiary of Naftiran and, therefore, NIOC. Created to take advantage of the South Pars Gas Field.

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Naftiran Intertrade Company: Offshore subsidiary of NIOC.

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Banking / Finance

Company

U.S.

U.N.

EU

Ansar Bank, aka Ansar Financial and Credit Institution: Created by Bonyad Taavon Sepah to provide financial and credit services to IRGC personnel.

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Ansar Exchange: Owned and controlled by Ansar Bank. Exchanged currency totaling over $1 billion for Ansar Bank, gave MODAFL the equivalent of roughly $100 million, as well as about $130 million in goods and services for the IRGC’s benefit.

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Iranian Atlas Company: Owned or controlled by Ansar Bank.

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Ansar Bank Brokerage Company: Owned or controlled by Ansar Bank.

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Ansar Information Technology: Owned or controlled by Ansar Bank.

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Bank of Industry and Mine: State owned, focusing on mining projects. Used by the IRGC to evade US and international sanctions. Provides bank account services for Bank Sepah. Collaborates with Bank Mellat and Bank Saderat.

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Europaisch-Iranische Handelsbank (EIH): German-licensed, subsidiary of Bank of Industry and Mine, focusing on international business with Iran. Partially owned by Bank Mellat and Bank Tejarat.

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Bank Mellat: State-owned, designated by U.S. Treasury for giving  Mehr Eqtesad Bank, which is owned by Bonyad Taavon Basij, hundreds of millions of dollars annually.

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First East Export Bank, P.L.C: Owned or controlled by Bank Mellat.

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Mellat Bank SB CJSC: Owned or controlled by Bank Mellat.

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Persia International Bank PLC: Owned or controlled by Bank Mellat.

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Bank Melli: Iran’s largest bank, used by Tehran to process transactions totaling billions of dollars by the IRGC Quds Force. Facilitates the IRGC’s sensitive activities, especially the purchase of materials for Iran's nuclear and missile programs.

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Arian Bank: Joint venture between Bank Melli and Bank Saderat to expand IRGC-controlled financial activities into Afghanistan. De-licensed by the Central Bank of Afghanistan in 2019.

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Bank Kargoshaee: Wholly owned by Bank Melli.

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Bank Refah Kargaran: Took over Bank Melli's activities following EU sanctions, provides services to MODAFL

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Melli Bank PLC: London-based subsidiary of Bank Melli.

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Mir Business Bank, aka Bank Melli Iran Zao: Moscow-based subsidiary of Bank Melli

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Bank Saderat: 94% state-owned institution which handles financial services for the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)-controlled Defense Industries Organization and IRGC-controlled Iran Electronics Industries. Used by the regime to transfer funds to terrorist organizations such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command (PFLP-GC) and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

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Bank Sepah: 100% IRGC-owned. Assisted Iran in funding development of missiles and nuclear weapons capability by supporting the IRGC-controlled Shahid Hemmat Indsutrial Group (SHIG) and Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG). Served as a platform for Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) to pay its agents abroad.

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Bank Sepah International PLC: London-based subsidiary of Bank Sepah.

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Post Bank of Iran: Acts on behalf of Bank Sepah, including by hiding Bank Sepah's connections in order to circumvent sanctions and helping exchange rials for euros.

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Bank Tejarat: Partially state-owned. Facilitated the transfer of tens of millions of dollars in support of the IRGC-affiliated Atomic Energy Organization of Iran's efforts to acquire yellowcake uranium.

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Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI): Provides financial services to MODAFL subordinate entities in order to circumvent or breach sanctions. Handles payments for Bank Sepah and entities associated with Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

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Banco Internacional De Desarrollo, C.A: Autonomous subsidiary of the Export Development Bank of Iran offering financial products to strengthen ties between the Iranian and Venezuelan economies.

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Mehr Eqtesad Bank: Provides financial services to the IRGC. Created by Bonyad Ta'avon Sepah, an organization comprised of IRGC commanders.

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Mehr-e Eqtesad-e Iranian Investment Company: Owned or controlled by Mehr Finance and Credit Institution, affiliated with the IRGC-controlled Tidewater.

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Etemad Amin Investment Co Mobin: Contributes to the financing of the regime and IRGC. Includes two IRGC-controlled funds, Tose'eh-ye E'temad and Shahriar-e Mahestan. Purchased a large portion of Telecommunications Company of Iran Stock in order to facilitate IRGC restrictions on free communications. Listed by the British government as an entity of proliferation concern.

    

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Jahan Aras Kish: IRGC-QF front company that transferred and converted funds for the QF and helped retrieve oil revenue from foreign bank accounts held by the Central Bank of Iran for IRGC-QF operations.

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Rashed Exchange: Utilized to convert currency for the IRGC-QF.

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Aviation / Shipping

Company

U.S.

U.N.

EU

Behnam Shahriyari Trading Company: Provided support and weapons to Hezbollah on behalf of the IRGC. Acts on behalf of Liner Transport Kish.

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Iran Air: Iran's national airline, used by the IRGC and MODAFL to transport military-related equipment, including missile and rocket components to Syria. Most Iran Air jets prohibited from entering EU airspace due to safety concerns. The UN has called on all countries to inspect cargo carried by Iran Air Cargo, and the EU has prohibited Iran Air Cargo access to EU airports.

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Iran Air Tours: Subsidiary of Iran Air. Serves as Iran Air's domestic air carrier.

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Liner Transport Kish: Employed by the IRGC to support terrorist activities outside of Iran. Provides material support, including weapons, to Hezbollah.

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Mahan Air: Provides transportation, funds transfers and personnel travel service to the IRGC Quds force and Hezbollah. Coordinated with the IRGC to ferry secret operatives and weapons in pursuit of the attempted assassination of the Saudi Ambassador to the US.

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Pars Aviation Service Company: Maintains IRGC Air Force aircraft. U.S. State Department has identified Pars Aviation Service Company as changing names to Pouya Air and complained to the U.N. Security Council in June 2019 that such a name change wasn’t reflected in the U.N. consolidated sanctions list.

 

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Tidewater Middle East Company: Port operator owned by Mehr-e Eqtesad Iranian Investment Company, Mehr Bank and the IRGC. Manages approximately 90% of Iranian container operations, and is used by the IRGC for illicit shipments.

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Telecommunications / Electronics

Company

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Iran Electronics Industries (IEI): IRGC-operated conglomerate responsible for facilitating the IRGC's control over the telecommunications and electronics sectors. Main shareholder of MTN Irancell (South African telecom giant MTN owns other 49%), the second largest mobile phone network operator in Iran, which enables the IRGC to exploit foreign technology to locate and persecute dissidents and suppress communications during fraudulent elections.

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Telecommunications Company of Iran (TCI): One of Iran’s leading telecommunications firms, 50% owned by the IRGC following a 2009 purchase by Etemad Amin Investment Company Mobin. The IRGC’s control of TCI enables it to better censor and restrict the free flow of communication.