Alireza Kazemi: Minister of Education

Kazemi was born in 1965 in the city of Mashhad, in northeastern Iran. Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, while he was a teenager, Kazemi entered the seminary in Mashhad – the same place as powerful regime figures including both former President Ebrahim Raisi, and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

While still a seminary student, Kazemi served in the Iran-Iraq War for a seventeen-month period. Though reporting is sparse, it is clear that he served in the Basij – given his concurrent involvement with the Mashhad seminary, his lifelong affiliation with the militia, and his personal statements. During this period, his brother, Mohammad, began his own involvement in the IRGC, rising to become a key commander. Kazemi’s early experience with the Basij solidified his ideological worldview, which aligns closely with those of Khamenei. He became a staunch proponent of the regime’s stringent policy of compulsory hijab, the regime’s repressive apparatus, and efforts to radicalize young people. This perspective has continued to define his career. 

After his service in the Iran-Iraq War, Kazemi returned to higher education. Having completed extensive seminary studies, he earned a bachelor’s degree in theology from Razavi University of Islamic Sciences – a university controlled by Astan Quds Razavi, a bonyad (ostensible charity) under Khamenei’s direction. He then went on to earn a second bachelor’s degree in English language and literature from Ferdowsi University, also located in Mashhad, completing his studies in 1992. 

Kazemi continued his studies through the 1990s, as the SBO was rapidly expanding on Iranian university campuses. He participated in these efforts, later describing the “mobilization of students and educators” as a key step in the Islamic Revolution. During this time, he also earned a master’s degree in jurisprudence from Mashhad branch of the Khamenei-linked Islamic Azad University, which has become increasingly intertwined with the Basij in recent years. Though he is often granted the title of “doctor” within regime-aligned media, Kazemi did not complete a doctorate. He began a PhD in strategic management from the Supreme National Defense University, but failed to complete the program. 

Despite leaving his doctoral studies, Kazemi was nevertheless appointed to an academic position on the faculty of Farhangian University, which specializes in training teachers under the auspices of the Ministry of Education. When the PBO was formed in 2001, Kazemi became closely involved. He later became the head of the militia’s Farhangian University branch, directing all Basij activities on campus, a position he held until entering Ebrahim Raisi’s cabinet in 2021. 

Given his leadership within the PBO since its founding, Kazemi has held a key role in critical junctures for the regime, such as installing President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the violent crackdowns against Green Movement protestors. Given that service in the IRGC (including its Basij militia) grants lifelong affiliation, Kazemi remains closely affiliated with the paramilitary – and has outright stated that he will continue to represent its interests in the Ministry of Education.

After his brief tenure as acting minister, Kazemi was removed from the Ministry of Education. Instead, Raisi installed him as deputy head of the Anti-Narcotics Directorate, under now-Minister of Interior Eskandar Momeni. In this role, Kazemi oversaw efforts to counter drug trafficking via the internet, accompanied Momeni to international conferences, and took on the role of spokesman for the directorate. 

Perhaps most concerning from this period of Kazemi’s career is the close working relationship he developed with Momeni, who is himself an IRGC commander. A close alignment between the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Education has significant implications for future crackdowns against political dissent.

In August of 2024, Pezeshkian appointed Kazemi to serve as minister of education, a selection made with Khamenei’s direction. This announcement was met with significant criticism from Iranian teachers and student activists, given his close affiliation with the Basij, his career within the Ministry of Education, and his strident support for the supreme leader’s agenda. It is possible that teachers could mobilize in opposition, possibly mounting strike action as has occurred in recent years. 

Given Kazemi’s record and affiliation, it is clear that he intends to expand the regime’s efforts to purge dissenting Iranian academics and students, expand indoctrination activities across schools and universities and empower ideological zealots within Iran’s academic institutions. Such activities would indicate the continuation of the “Third Cultural Revolution” across Iran’s universities and schools, which was spearheaded by the previous administration as per Khamenei’s orders. 

In line with this, Kazemi has also already sought to expand the presence of the Basij within higher education, lowering university entry requirements at Khamenei’s direction in an effort to expand the enrollment of the militia’s personnel. Furthermore, he has announced his intentions to create “behavioral certificates” for all teachers in Iran – a move that would monitor the ideological compliance of teachers and subsequently reward or punish them. These early actions by the new minister of education reveals Pezeshkian will not ease pressure on universities and schools in Iran, which have, in many ways, been the pulse of the anti-regime protests in Iran.