Iran Unyielding on Advancing Ballistic Missile Program

Iran’s recent high-profile violations of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action are calculated to incrementally push the envelope and show that it can ramp up illicit enrichment activities while keeping its breakout time – the time needed to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon – long enough to forestall a crisis. Nevertheless, while these provocations are cause for concern, Iran’s been exploiting another loophole in the broader JCPOA since the deal’s inception to advance a key element of attaining a nuclear weapons capability: its ballistic missile arsenal. An imminent Iranian attempt to launch a satellite into space – a move with implications for Iran’s attainment of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability – highlights the ongoing danger posed by Iran’s ballistic missile program.  

A nuclear weapon requires three components: enriched fissile material, a delivery vehicle (usually some sort of missile—whether fired from land, sea or air), and a warhead that integrates the two. For this reason, Iran’s ballistic missiles cannot be separated from the nuclear issue because they are the likely primary launch platform for any nuclear, chemical or biological warhead. Iran’s continued efforts to make its ballistic missiles more effective and operational, along with its unrelenting refusal to countenance compromise, offer strong evidence that Iran ultimately seeks a nuclear weapons capability.     

U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2231, the resolution endorsing the Iran nuclear deal, ostensibly banned Iran from advancing its ballistic missile program for eight years after its October 2015 adoption. However, Iran’s nuclear negotiators fought hard for ambiguous language in the resolution which has enabled Iran to technically justify the ongoing development and test-firing of ballistic missiles. The prior resolutions that UNSCR 2231 replaced clearly stated that “Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.” Under UNSCR 2231, Iran is merely “called upon not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology.”

The softening in UNSCR 2231’s language degraded the ban on ballistic missile testing and related activities from a legal obligation to a non-legally binding appeal. Further, UNSCR 2231 refers to missiles “designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons,” rather than simply “capable” of such delivery. It should be noted that eight out of thirteen of Iran’s operational ballistic missile systems meet the internationally agreed upon standard for determining the inherent capability of delivering a nuclear weapon, as they can deliver a 500 kg payload 300 km or more. While the bulk of its missiles are therefore nuclear capable, Iran rigorously lobbied for the revised phrasing and contends that its missiles are not “designed” for such capability as Iran officially denies harboring intentions to seek a nuclear weapons capability.

Iran has taken advantage of the watered-down resolution to continue to test-launch and upgrade the range, accuracy and lethality of its ballistic missile arsenal, referred to by the Center for Strategic and International Studies as the “largest and most diverse in the Middle East.” Iran has an array of short and medium range ballistic missiles that can travel up to 2000 km, placing southeastern Europe and the entirety of the Middle East in its crosshairs, including sensitive U.S. and NATO military targets.

In the period between the reaching of the nuclear deal in July 2015 and the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018, Iran reportedly carried out at least 23 known ballistic missile test-launches. Since the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and subsequent imposition of a “maximum pressure” campaign – steps taken over the objections of the European Union, Russia, and China – Iran has had every incentive to rein in its ballistic missile pursuits so that its would-be business partners could justify continued trade and investment with Tehran. Instead, Iran has responded by further accelerating its ballistic missile tests, launching at least seven medium-range and five short-range ballistic missiles in 2018.

One of these tests was considered a “significant” medium-range ballistic missile test on December 1, believed to be of a Khorramshahr capable of carrying multiple warheads and of striking southeastern Europe. In February 2019, Iran unveiled a new ballistic missile called Dezful at an “underground” missile production facility, a longer-range upgrade to its existing Zolfaghar missiles. In July 2019, amid heightened tensions over a series of Iranian attacks on oil tankers, Iran reportedly test-fired a medium-range Shahab-3 missile, that flew nearly 1000 km, according to U.S. officials.

In addition to its missile program, Iran is actively developing a space launch capability, directly connected to its development of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). On April 20, 2016, Iran test-launched a new rocket, the Simorgh space launch vehicle, a key step in the development of Iran’s long-range ballistic missile program. On July 27, 2017, Iran tested the Simorgh again. Iran sought to portray the Simorgh launches as successes, but analysts believe that neither test resulted in launching a satellite into orbit. In January and February 2019, Iran attempted two additional space vehicle test launches intended to place satellites into orbit, both of which failed. In a statement condemning the launches, State Department Deputy Spokesman Robert Palladino noted, “Space launch vehicles use technologies that are virtually identical and interchangeable with those used in ballistic missiles, including in Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). This attempted launch furthers Iran’s ability to eventually build such a weapon that threatens our allies.”

As tensions between Iran and the West continue to escalate, satellite imagery showing increased activity at Iran’s Imam Khomeni Space Center has indicated that Iran has been preparing to launch another satellite into space. Iran’s continued advancement of its ballistic missile program and efforts to refine its space-launch capability are inconsistent with Iran’s declarations that it does not seek a nuclear weapons capability. No other end would justify the resources Iran has sank into its ballistic missile program, nor the sacrifices that have arisen due to its sanctioning.

Both the U.S. and EU have called upon Iran to cease its ballistic missile provocations, but Iranian political and military leaders have proclaimed that Iran will never yield or negotiate on its ballistic missile program. At the February 2019 Munich Security Conference, Foreign Minister Javad Zarif gave an impassioned defense of Iran’s missile program, invoking Saddam Hussein’s chemical weapons attacks on Iranians to insist that Iran would never give up the defensive protection of its ballistic missiles. Zarif’s performative indignation was particularly rich given Iran’s role in the development of Syria’s chemical weapon program and its efforts to obfuscate the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war, to say nothing of the documents unearthed by Israeli intelligence showing that Iran had actively explored fitting nuclear warheads onto ballistic missiles and detonation mechanisms.

While the EU sanctioned Iran’s primary intelligence service in January 2019 in response to a series of Iran-backed terrorist plots, it has failed to hold Iran accountable for its ballistic missile pursuits. The EU has continued to push for European businesses ties with Iran, going so far as to create a special purpose vehicle known as INSTEX (Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges) to allow European companies to facilitate ongoing non-dollar transactions with the regime through a third-party in circumvention of U.S. sanctions. The EU has demanded that Iran cease its ballistic missile tests, but has proceeded to step on its own messaging in its quixotic quest to keep the JCPOA on life support. The EU should close ranks with the U.S. and refrain from encouraging further trade and investment so long as Iran continues to advance and refuses to negotiate over its ballistic missile program.

Jordan Steckler is a Research Analyst at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI). Follow him on Twitter @JordanESteckler.