Lebanon’s 2018 Parliamentary Elections

Lebanon just concluded its first parliamentary elections in nine years. The results are in, and the March 14 Alliance, Beirut’s pro-Western political bloc, has suffered a setback. For the first time since the 2005 Cedar Revolution, the parties aligned with the Hezbollah-dominated March 8 camp will now control a majority of Lebanon’s parliament.

Explaining the Outcome

It’s still too early to know precisely what caused March’s 14 setback, and much depends on the overall voting turnout as well as the regional and sectarian voting breakdowns. Preliminarily, it appears that one can attribute much of March 14’s failure to its internal divisions and infighting, and March 8’s success to its cohesion, accomplishments, and better electoral strategy. When a complete statistical picture emerges, actual reasons for the outcome can be determined, though it is worth noting that overall, voting participation was 49 percent, a drop from 54 percent in 2009.

March 14’s Failures

Saad Hariri’s Future Movement, March 14’s flagship party, suffered the biggest loss of the pro-Western bloc. However, this should come as no surprise. The party is heavily dependent on Sunni votes, and in addition to contending with pro-March 8 Sunni challengers, Future also faced opponents among pro-March 14 Sunnis – primarily Ashraf Rifi – in critical districts like Sidon, Beirut II, and Tripoli. These challengers ended up siphoning away votes without managing to win any seats themselves. Lebanese Forces managed to gain seats, but allied with March 8’s leading party – the Free Patriotic Movement – and challenged its sister Kataeb Party in several districts, which likely led to the latter’s losses.

March 14’s base is also demoralized. Pro-Western forces won parliamentary majorities in both the 2005 and 2009 elections, but have delivered very little. To the contrary, Lebanon has continued to drift slowly towards the positions Hezbollah favors, with the group’s opponents seemingly helpless to reverse the tide. The pro-Western Alliance’s U.S. and European sponsors compounded that by abandoning their Lebanese allies during critical junctures over the past decade. The West stood idly by as Hezbollah staged an armed takeover of Beirut in May 2008 in response to a pro-Western government’s decision to shut down the group’s telecommunications network. Even more critically, Western powers – particularly the United States – drew down their regional influence just as Hezbollah’s sponsor Iran was ramping up its backing of the group in Lebanon, expanding its regional foothold, and propping up the Shiite group’s ally Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Add to that mix March 14’s petty fractiousness, and the result is a constituent base that no longer has confidence that its leaders can deliver on the vision of the Cedar Revolution.

March 8’s Gains

However, March 8’s gains cannot all be attributed to March 14’s failures. The Hezbollah-dominated bloc had many more achievements than its pro-Western counterpart during the past nine years, but particularly in the last two. Its largest party – the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) – has worked in tandem with Hezbollah to simultaneously obstruct its opponents and push through its own agenda. Perhaps its greatest victory was managing to secure the election of its founder Michel Aoun as president, an accomplishment which likely galvanized his devoted, primarily Maronite Christian base. March 8 was also able to push through Lebanon’s new electoral law, and could take credit for many of the reforms and accomplishments of Saad Hariri’s government by virtue of forming a majority of his cabinet.

However, the engine behind March 8 is and always has been Hezbollah, and the Party of God ran a successful campaign that outmaneuvered its opponents. Early on, it created a united electoral front with the Amal Movement – its Shiite ally-cum-rival – which effectively eliminated any credible Shiite opposition. Having squared that dynamic away, the Party’s electoral strategy focused on ensuring that its allies – particularly FPM – maximized their numbers of seats. Through these allies, Hezbollah could dominate parliament by proxy and use them to protect its interests. Hezbollah also backed several Sunni opponents to Hariri in important districts, which served to scatter the Sunni vote and take some seats away from the premier.

Next Step--Electing a Parliament Speaker and a Prime Minister

Lebanon’s next steps will be critical for determining the country’s direction. With parliament in hand, March 8 will be setting Beirut’s course. One thing is for certain, Nabih Berri – a fixture of Lebanese politics since the late 1980s – will remain in his 26-year position as speaker of the parliament. Despite tensions with FPM, he remains Lebanon’s most powerful Shiite political figure, and has already received the endorsement of Hariri, Jumblatt, and Hezbollah.

However, it’s worth noting that Berri is now 80 years old, and whether he will retain his position beyond this parliamentary term is unclear. It also remains unclear who will replace Berri, if and when he decides to surrender his post. Though Berri has no political heir apparent, he could spend the next four years grooming a successor. Absent that, Hezbollah’s Mohammad Raad or his ally Jamil al-Sayyed – a former head of Lebanon’s General Directorate of General Security who was implicated in Rafic Hariri’s 2005 assassination – could be alternatives. Others who may be considered are Ghazi Zuaiter or Ali Hassan Khalil from within Berri’s own Amal Movement.

After the legislature is squared away, Lebanese president Aoun will consult with parliament’s speaker on the appointment of a new prime minister. Saad Hariri’s government, formed in December 2016, was meant to be a hold-over until the current elections. However, despite his electoral setback, Hariri – who is calling for the swift formation of a new government –  remains Lebanon’s strongest Sunni political leader, and is most likely to be tasked with the premiership and forming a new cabinet again.  He has also been endorsed by the Free Patriotic Movement.

Towards a Pro-Hezbollah National Defense Strategy?

The more significant event to watch for, however, is the formation of a Lebanese National Defense Strategy. Though Aoun promised discussion on the strategy would begin after parliamentary elections were complete, this will likely not take place until the formation of a new cabinet, which – in Lebanon – holds executive power and commands its armed forces.

Given the outcome of the parliamentary elections, the next cabinet will be dominated by Hezbollah’s political allies, which will influence the direction and final form of the strategy.  Despite tensions on display during the election season, Free Patriotic Movement’s elections platform called for strengthening its relations with Hezbollah, and the group reaffirmed that alliance as soon as the polls closed. Moreover, FPM’s platform also echoed Hezbollah’s so-called “golden rule” for national defense based on a tripartite “Army-People-Resistance” formula. In FPM’s iteration, though the army assumes the central role, the “people and the resistance” nonetheless will play a critical part in the nation’s defense.

Aoun – directly and via his allotted portion of cabinet members – will also affect its outcome. It is worth nothing that Hezbollah assumes a central role in the defense strategy Aoun proposed in 2008, a position he has consistently maintained ever since. As for what it will mean for Lebanon’s newly minted “dissociation policy,” one need only look to the president’s recent statement insisting that Hezbollah’s presence in Syria must be accepted as fait accompli. In an interview with the BBC Arabic, Aoun said, “Hezbollah’s involvement in the struggle in Syria has become an issue on a regional level, whereby the party is now part of the balance of power, and cannot withdraw unilaterally from the ongoing battle [in Syria].”

Even if Hariri is reappointed to the premiership, he will not likely be able to change this outcome. After all, even with his formerly larger parliamentary bloc, Hariri’s 2016 governmental policy statement included a “Resistance Clause.” That clause legitimized Hezbollah and its armed activities by affirming the right of “citizens” – as opposed to the state’s armed forces – “to resist Israeli occupation, respond to its aggression, and return the occupied lands”  to which Lebanon lays claim, including the Lebanese portion of Ghajar, the hills of Kfarchouba, and the Shebaa Farms. With a smaller parliamentary presence that must now show deference to Hezbollah’s FPM allies, Hariri’s ability to influence policy will now be even more limited.