What Stands Behind Hezbollah’s Delayed Response to Shukr’s Killing?

Two weeks have passed since the Israeli targeted killing of Hezbollah's top military commander Fuad Shukr, which crossed the organization's declared red line regarding Israeli attacks in Beirut. Nevertheless, the anticipated response by Hezbollah has not yet been carried out and various representatives from the organization have issued apologetic statements explaining the delay in retaliation. 

A week after the Israeli attack, it was Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s secretary-general, who declared that the organization would wait for the right moment to respond. As another week went by Ali Fayyad, a Hezbollah parliament member explained that the delay in the response was part of the calculated way Hezbollah managed the battle, and his colleague Hassan Izz-al-Din claimed that operational conditions on the battleground would determine the nature of the reaction. Ali Damush, the deputy head of Hezbollah's Executive Council, claimed that the late response holds the value of causing terror and fear in Israel. Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, a close political ally of Hezbollah, also joined the efforts to explain the delay and said that “revenge is a dish best served cold.” 

The truth is that Hezbollah rarely reacts quickly to Israeli attacks. Over the years, the organization has demonstrated its ability to carry out calculated decision processes before coming up with the “right” goldilocks mixture of conditions regarding the nature of the target, its geographic location, and the appropriate weapon to hit it with, that will answer Nasrallah's need to maintain the deterrence equation with Israel. 

Nevertheless, Hezbollah is faced with a unique challenge in the current situation. The Israeli airstrike on Beirut not only defied Nasrallah's declared red line regarding the geographic location, but also took out one of the highest military leaders in the organization and a close adviser to Nasrallah himself. This demonstrated Israel’s intelligence and operational superiority in a successful pinpoint attack against a high-value target in the organization’s stronghold. 

It is safe to assess that Hezbollah will retaliate over Shukr’s assassination, but coming up with an equivalent target to hit on the Israeli side is a complex and risky endeavor. Israel has already made it clear that targeting Tel Aviv, the obvious equivalent of Beirut, will not be tolerated. The high-profile Israeli Air Force attack on the Port of Hodeidah in Yemen after a Houthi drone hit the city last month, was a clear message. Nasrallah should take well into consideration that any attempt by Hezbollah to hit Tel Aviv could lead to a disproportionate Israeli response. 

At the same time, the intelligence and operational capabilities needed to target a high-ranking Israeli military officer equivalent to Shukr (such as the IDF chief of staff or the commander of the IDF’s Northern Command), are of such a level that it is unlikely the organization will be able to hit such a target during the current high-level of alert on the Israeli side. Never in its history was Hezbollah able to reach such high-level targets, and therefore it focused its efforts on more convenient targets such as sensitive static infrastructures or lower-level moving human targets such as military border patrol, diplomats, or even Israeli tourists. 

At the moment, when the tensions between Israel and Hezbollah are at their highest point in years and some in Israel even suggest exploiting the situation to aggressively attack Hezbollah to reduce the threat it poses along Israel's northern border, Nasrallah must take into consideration that he might be facing an Israeli “strategic ambush,” meant to lead Hezbollah to respond in such a way that will give Israel as a casus belli to carry out a massive counter-attack. Reports coming out of Beirut indicate that Hezbollah is already taking precautions and evacuating its headquarters. 

In the background, stands the anticipated Iranian response to the killing of Hamas’s Political Leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and the massive U.S. military buildup in the region, meant to deter Iran from acting. 

Under those complex conditions and taking into consideration the potential risks of miscalculating Israeli intentions, it is easier to understand the lengthy decision-making process and preparations Hezbollah is going through before acting. Whether the revenge for Fuad Shukr's death will be a dish best served cold, as suggested by Nabih Berri, or Hezbollah will choose to act in the coming days with the hope that its retaliation will be contained by Israel, the clashes and attacks along the Israeli-Lebanese border still hold the potential for miscalculation leading to all-out war. 

Dror Doron is a senior advisor at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) focusing on Hezbollah and Lebanon.  He spent nearly two decades as a senior analyst in the Office of Israel’s Prime Minister. Dror is on Twitter @DrorDoron