UANI Top 10 Iran Sanctions Targets [May 2024]

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Iraj Masjedi, Deputy Coordinator of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force

YOB: 1957

Iraj Masjedi is the deputy coordinator of the IRGC Quds Force. Masjedi was previously a senior advisor to the commander of the Quds Force, Iran’s ambassador to Iraq, and led IRGC coordination with Shiite militias in Iraq, which carried out operations resulting in the deaths of coalition troops. In his role as deputy coordinator, he is part of the Quds Force’s senior brass responsible for coordinating Quds Force activities across its various branches, particularly its support for the Axis of Resistance, which is composed of U.S., U.K., and EU-designated terrorist organizations. The U.S. has previously sanctioned Masjedi and its allies should follow suit.

Mohsen Chizari, Deputy Commander for Operations of the IRGC Quds Force

DOB: April 1, 1959

Mohsen Chizari is the deputy commander for operations of the IRGC Quds Force. In this position, Chizari is part of the Quds Force senior brass. The U.S. previously sanctioned him in 2011 under Executive Order 13572 targeting Syrian officials and others involved in human rights abuses in Syria. Chizari has also been active in Iraq, with U.S. forces detaining him in 2006 for proliferation of weapons from Iran to Iraqi militias, which were used to kill coalition forces. Chizari should be sanctioned by the U.S. government under the Executive Order 13224 counterterrorism authority and its allies should also sanction him. Chizari has not been sanctioned by the U.K. and the EU.

Saeed Jalili, Representative of Iran’s Supreme Leader on the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC)

DOB: September 6, 1965

Saeed Jalili serves as the representative of Iran’s supreme leader on the SNSC, a position he has held for years. In this capacity Jalili has been a standing member of the SNSC as it deliberated on policy, ranging from repression at home to terrorism abroad. He has been a fierce advocate of expanding Iran’s nuclear program. Jalili just announced his candidacy for the presidency of the Islamic Republic in 2024 after the death of Ebrahim Raisi. As a member of the IRGC Basij militia, he is part of one of the most repressive institutions in the Islamic Republic. The U.S. should sanction him under Executive Order 13876 targeting the Office of Iran’s Supreme Leader as Jalili is a direct appointee of the supreme leader. Its allies should sanction him for his role on the SNSC which contributed to Iran’s decision-making in arming and funding its terrorist proxies and partners around the world.

Abdolreza Mesgarian, Commander of the IRGC Ramadan Headquarters 

Abdolreza Mesgarian is the Commander of the IRGC Ramadan Headquarters. The Ramadan Headquarters is responsible for liaising with Iraqi Shiite militias, some of whom are U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations. The U.S. government should sanction Mesgarian under Executive Order 13224 and its allies should do the same under their respective authorities.

Seyyed Mohammad Taqi Shahcheraghi, Head of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Election Headquarters and IRGC Commander

YOB: 1961 

Shahcheraghi, who is an IRGC commander, has been involved in human rights violations in Iran, including women’s rights abuses, internet restrictions, and attacks on freedom of speech. He served as IRGC commander for a number of Iranian provinces, including Qom, Mazandaran, Semnan, Golestan, and Tehran, as well commanding the IRGC’s 17th Ali-ibn-Taleb Division. Shahcheraghi has overseen the recruitment and radicalisation of “young students and children” for the creation of a new IRGC-linked cyber-army in Qom, known as the “Hazrat Qassem Army.” Shahceraghi is also a board member of the IRGC and Hezbollah-affiliated University of Religions and Denominations, which operates on both U.S. and European soil. As head of the regime’s Elections Headquarters, he has also been involved in electoral rigging and election engineering.

Ahmad Marvi, Chairman of the Astan Quds Razavi Foundation 

YOB: 1958

As chairman of Aston Quds Razavi, Ahmad Marvi leads the foundation’s provision of material and financial support to the IRGC and its network of terrorist militias. This includes terrorist financing and financially aiding the regime’s domestic suppressive apparatus. Marvi is also closely involved in the Astan Quds Razavi’s money laundering operations. He was previously a key member of the Office of Supreme Leader, which has been involved in committing gross human rights violations in Iran and terrorist activities abroad. Marvi has already been sanctioned by the U.S. government. Its allies should sanction him under their respective authorities as well.

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The Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS)

IPIS is a government-affiliated think tank in Iran, subordinate to the Foreign Ministry. In the past, IPIS has sponsored a Holocaust-denial conference. IPIS plays a key role in the Iranian regime’s influence operations around the world, and was affiliated with the Iran Experts Initiative (IEI), a platform which Tehran used to engage in malign influence operations on Western soil. A former head of IPIS, Mostafa Zahrani, also served as a regime connector which led to a student exchange program with Princeton University that resulted in a Princeton student Xiyue Wang being taken hostage by the Iranian security services. IPIS should be sanctioned for engaging in malign influence operations as well as under Executive Order 14078 for being a platform which Iran’s regime exploited to take a Western national hostage. U.S. allies should sanction IPIS under their respective authorities as well.

Astan Quds Razavi Foundation

Astan Quds Razavi Foundation functions as a key economic partner for the IRGC and its Quds Force, providing financial and material support to IRGC and its network of terrorist militias such as Hezbollah. Astan Quds Razavi closely cooperates with IRGC and Hezbollah senior leadership. It operates as a slush fund for the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the IRGC, enabling the regime’s global money laundering activities. The U.S. government has already sanctioned Astan Quds Razavi. Its allies should sanction it as well under their respective authorities.

Mostazafan Foundation

The Mostazafan Foundation operates as a key economic partner for the IRGC and its Quds Force, providing financial and material support to IRGC and its network of terrorist militias, such as the Fatemeyioun Brigade. Mostazafan has de-facto been functioning as the IRGC’s “money box,” whereby its financial assets and resources are made available to senior IRGC commanders, not least to fund terrorist activities. The U.S. has already sanctioned the Mostazafan Foundation. Its allies should sanction it as well under their respective authorities.

Reconstruction Organization of the Holy Shrines

The Reconstruction Organization of the Holy Shrines is fully operationalized and utilized by the IRGC Quds Force. IRGC Quds Force members are embedded throughout the organization, with the entity being used by the Quds Force as a vehicle for operations and for the IRGC to gain access to foreign soil. The head and senior leadership of the organization is directly selected by the IRGC Quds Force commander. The Reconstruction Organization of the Holy Shrines operates de-facto as a “front company” for the IRGC to both launder money and finance terrorist activities. The U.S. government has already sanctioned the Reconstruction Organization of the Holy Shrines. Its allies should sanction it as well under their respective authorities.