Iran’s Snapback Strategy

Since the U.S. decision to trigger the snapback sanctions mechanism on Iran under U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, Iran has responded cautiously. While there have been calls from various officials to further violate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the regime appears to have adopted a near-term strategy of restraint. It could morph into agitation depending on how the U.S. complaint is received by the U.N. Security Council.

In his criticism of Washington’s decision to trigger the snapback sanctions mechanism, Iran’s foreign minister focused mostly on its legalities, arguing that the term “JCPOA participant” under Resolution 2231 is merely “descriptive and exhortatory; it lists as a factual matter who the participants were at the time of the adoption of the resolution in 2015 and has no other definition.” He also wrote that Iran “has already and clearly shown its good faith and full responsibility. Now, it is the turn of the international community.” This was a signal of the regime’s intent to condition any escalation on developments in the U.N. Security Council.

Around the same time, Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations also gave a conciliatory interview, saying “[i]f the next administration, whoever that might be, is going to accept Resolution 2231 and implement the provisions of the JCPOA in all honesty, I believe there is room for the United States to join other members of the JCPOA within the context of the Joint Commission to talk about different issues related to the Iran deal.” Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Ali Shamkhani likewise dismissed the move, dubbing it a “propaganda ploy.”

Indeed, the circumspect Iranian reaction crossed the political spectrum. Last week, the Speaker of Iran’s Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a political nemesis of President Hassan Rouhani, warned “[h]istory shows us that standing against terrorists as well as governing the affairs of the country with ration and prudence will always lead to achieving great victories.” Ghalibaf use of the term “prudence” was particularly noteworthy, as that borrowed from Rouhani’s political brand of a government of “prudence and hope.” Conservative lawmakers also introduced legislation which would require an automatic withdrawal from the JCPOA within 72 hours of prior U.N. Security Council resolutions being re-imposed against Iran. Such positioning may indicate that a consensus has been reached at the highest levels of the Islamic Republic to tread carefully in the immediate aftermath of the U.S. announcement to trigger the snapback mechanism—calculating that the costs of immediately ramping up its nuclear program outweigh any benefit. As of now, it appears only later in the 30-day snapback process is the Islamic Republic positioning itself to take action—at least on the nuclear file.

Iran may also view the recent visit of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) director-general as another opportunity for it to buy political space. While Iranian authorities have publicly said that Rafael Grossi’s trip was unrelated to the snapback effort underway in New York, the timing of the visit comes weeks before the next gathering of the JCPOA Joint Commission and board of governors’ meeting of the IAEA in September—the first one since its resolution calling on Iran to fully cooperate with the agency’s safeguards inquiry. It is also after Grossi’s ultimatum to Iran last month, saying if the safeguards issues weren’t resolved by the end of July, “things will be bad.”

As a result, Iranian officials have been telegraphing openness to avoid further adverse action on the part of the international community in September, which will be a particularly sensitive month for the Iran file. We see this strategy in the comments from the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization Ali Akbar Salehi, who said that Tehran had started a “new chapter” with the IAEA during the visit of the director-general. In their joint statement after the visit, Iran agreed to provide the IAEA access to the two sites it had specified and dates for the visit were agreed to. Tehran also won a commitment from the IAEA that it would not have further questions and further requests for access to locations other than those declared by Iran under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol. But that promise was bounded by language saying “in the present context, based on analysis of available information to the IAEA”—meaning that the IAEA is giving itself room, at least on paper, to make future requests if new information arises.

Thus, Tehran is treading carefully and its calculation appears to be aimed at buying time through these concessions, like the agreement with the IAEA on its safeguards case, which it feels will have the added benefit of avoiding a rift with the P4+1 as the snapback debate heats up before the U.N. Security Council. That doesn’t mean the regime’s battles with the IAEA are over. Indeed, it’s likely the distrust will continue. Just as the IAEA’s director-general was finishing his visit, Jam-e Jam newspaper, which is affiliated with Iranian state television, published a cartoon of Grossi depicting him as being under the influence of Israel, the United States, and the European Union.

Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI).