Eskandar Momeni: Minister of Interior

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In the weeks following his inauguration, Masoud Pezeshkian named Eskandar Momeni, a senior commander in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as interior minister. Momeni’s ties to both the regime’s repressive apparatus and hardline regime figures like parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf made him a suitable candidate for the IRGC and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Despite presenting himself as a technocrat, Momeni has a long record of operating as a stringent regime enforcer. By appointing a figure with this background, the IRGC’s continued consolidation of authority over the Ministry of Interior is assured. Only weeks after assuming the role of interior minister, on August 24, upon the direct orders of Khamenei, Momeni was appointed as the deputy commander-in-chief of the armed forces in the police force. His appointment explicitly reveals how Khamenei intends to create greater coordination between the interior ministry and the police force in anticipation of forthcoming anti-regime protests. 

IRGC Service

Momeni was born in 1962 in the city of Qaem Shahr in the province of Mazandaran. Shortly after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Momeni enlisted in the IRGC and fought in the Iran-Iraq War. He initially served within the 25th Karbala Division alongside prominent IRGC figures like current IRGC commander-in-chief Hossein Salami. Over the course of the conflict, he also led an air defense battalion and a special division. Momeni was also a commander in the IRGC’s counter-revolutionary campaign in northern Iran, which sought to violently quell anti-regime movements. This gave him an operational familiarity with repressive tactics, which he later implemented to suppress anti-regime demonstrations and within restive border regions in his capacity as a law enforcement official.

Following the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War, Momeni became a leader within the Mazandaran Martyrs Commemoration Congress, a veteran’s group promoted by Khamenei that exploits the conflict for the purpose of radicalization. Throughout his later career, Momeni has remained closely associated with both IRGC veterans’ groups and current leadership. He also continues to use his IRGC title in an official capacity.

Early Law Enforcement Career

In the 1990s, Momeni pivoted from his IRGC service into the regime’s uniformed police, the Law Enforcement Forces (LEF), created in 1990. In addition to completing his police training, he earned multiple university degrees, including a doctorate in national security. For his first LEF post, Momeni worked within the police forces of Khorasan Province (northeast of Iran), becoming its commander in 2001 – a position he retained until 2002. In this position, he earned a national reputation for being a stringent law enforcement official, spearheading efforts to reduce crime in the province. In particular, he sought to tackle the border region’s drug-smuggling crisis with a series of high-profile actions – though his efforts were ultimately met with little success.

While commanding police forces in Khorasan, Momeni developed a close working relationship with Ghalibaf, who was then serving as the regime’s top law enforcement official. Along with other law enforcement officials, Momeni assisted Ghalibaf in establishing the Police Emergency Center 110, Iran’s emergency response system. In 2003, Ghalibaf appointed him to lead the newly established center, providing Momeni with his first position of national authority within the regime.

In the subsequent years, Ghalibaf’s patronage continued to benefit Momeni’s early law enforcement career. In 2004, he was appointed as deputy head of the LEF responsible for operations, a position he retained until 2007. After Ghalibaf departed the LEF, Momeni continued to enjoy the support of his superiors, becoming commander of Iran’s traffic police. Through his six years at this post, Momeni assisted in leading significant crackdowns against political dissent. He notably supported efforts to curtail the 2009 Green Movement protests. In 2012, Ahmadinejad bestowed Momeni with the highest service award for law enforcement officials, rewarding his loyalty during this period. 

Furthermore, under Momeni’s direction, the traffic police also became heavily involved in enforcing morality codes, including the mandatory hijab. In part to advance these enforcement measures, Momeni also oversaw the implementation of extensive cameras and monitoring centers throughout Iran’s major roadways. He also expanded the traffic police by thousands of patrol units. Since Momeni’s tenure, traffic police have imposed fees, impounded vehicles, and employed violent measures to deter Iranians from violating the regime’s repressive laws. Though corruption scandals have overshadowed these decisions during his tenure, they demonstrate his political instincts and outlook as a police official – both in favor of the regime’s securitization.

LEF Deputy Commander and Anti-Narcotics Directorate

In 2015, Momeni was again promoted, becoming deputy commander of the LEF with oversight of the National Police. One of his key initiatives in this position was to form the Economic Police, a new law enforcement body tasked with preventing currency-related crimes and smuggling.

However, Momeni’s tenure was marked by his management of the regime’s actions during the 2017-2018 protests in Iran. He accused the protestors of being “rioters” and saboteurs under the employ of foreign powers, and authorized deadly crackdowns in his capacity as LEF deputy commander. This heavy-handed approach led to the arrest of thousands of Iranians by National Police. These actions amounted to Momeni leaning upon his hardline instincts and earned him extensive plaudits from other senior law enforcement officials within the regime for his “crisis management.”

Internal pressure within the regime prompted a reshuffle within the LEF shortly after the crackdowns. As a result, Momeni was transferred to command the Anti-Narcotics Directorate, a position relevant to his prior experience in Khorasan. In this role, Momeni ostensibly sought to counter drug smuggling, particularly in border regions like Baluchistan. Additionally, Momeni spearheaded efforts to bring the Anti-Narcotics Directorate under IRGC purview, coordinating various initiatives with the paramilitary and its Basij militia. He also issued various public statements hailing the IRGC’s international operations and leadership, and declared support for the Axis of Resistance. Though this would appear contradictory, given the IRGC and its proxies earn significant revenue via drug smuggling, it demonstrates the ideological nature of law enforcement under the Islamic Republic.

Nevertheless, over the course of his six years in this position, Momeni carefully worked to foster a new reputation as a respectable technocrat. Momeni has participated in various United Nations conferences and international agreements on law enforcement, and has publicized his new self-described “humanitarian” programs aimed at countering addiction. This has provided him with the appearance of competence, despite his record as a tough regime enforcer. Like Pezeshkian and other members of his cabinet, Momeni’s “moderate” credentials are superficial and do not reflect his record. 

Conclusion

Momeni’s appointment as Minister of Interior demonstrates the limitations on Pezeshkian’s power as president, as he appears to be primarily the choice of Ghalibaf and Khamenei. The decision to keep this position in the hands of an ideologue IRGC commander with extensive experience waging counter-insurgency campaigns and crackdowns against political dissent also reveals that the regime may anticipate further protests in the coming months and years. It is worth noting that Momeni has made meetings with IRGC and police force commanders a priority since assuming his position. Though Momeni has sought to portray himself as a technocratic moderate in recent years, his political outlook is clear. He will defend the regime through force and is unwilling to relax the enforcement of the regime’s most repressive laws. Momeni is well positioned to coordinate and direct the regime’s security apparatus as required and is willing to use deadly force, as he has done in the past.

Ultimately, Momeni offers little change from the tenure of his predecessor, Ahmad Vahidi, another seasoned IRGC commander. Like Vahidi, Momeni will continue to increase coordination between the interior ministry and the IRGC, not least in relation to domestic security. The most significant change is his deeper connection to law enforcement, enabling more effective coordination with his subordinates at the Ministry of Interior. It is now explicitly clear that this was Khamenei’s precise objective, underscored by the fact that on August 24, 2024, the supreme leader appointed the new interior minister to simultaneously serve as deputy commander-in-chief of the armed forces in the police force. 

Furthermore, Momeni will serve as an instrument for Ghalibaf and other hardliners to wield influence within Pezeshkian’s administration and ensure the execution of Khamenei’s domestic agenda – even as the new president pursues stylistic changes and sanctions relief on the world stage.