Hassan Rouhani

Hassan Rouhani

1st Tier: President of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Although President Rouhani hails from the so-called moderate wing of Iran's political scene, he is a loyal regime insider committed to upholding Iran's revolutionary Islamist ideology. Rouhani has held numerous top positions in Iran's political, security, and clerical echelons during his decades-long career, including stints as secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council under two different presidents, lead nuclear negotiator with the European Union (EU) from 2003-2005, and is a sitting member of Iran's Expediency Council—dedicated to resolving disputes between parliament and the Guardian Council— and Assembly of Experts, the body tasked with advising the Supreme Leader and selecting his successor.

While Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei retains sole authority over virtually all Iranian foreign policy and nuclear decisions, President Rouhani has been a loyal soldier in defending and implementing the supreme leader’s dictates. Rouhani infamously boasted in his 2011 memoir that he had succeeded as Iran's chief negotiator in covertly advancing Iran's enrichment efforts under the cover of negotiations with the EU  between 2003 and 2005.

While in office, Rouhani has denigrated the United States and Israel, praised Hezbollah and other terrorist proxies, and backed Iran's regional adventurism. However, compared with Iranian hard-liners, Rouhani has pursued a pragmatic tactical approach, at times favoring expanding civil liberties domestically and limited economic and diplomatic engagement with the West, in order for Iran to maintain its image internationally while preserving its regime and spreading the Islamic Revolution.

Rouhani's principal achievement in office was the nuclear deal his administration reached with the P5+1 in July 2015, which granted Iran sanctions relief and a windfall of more than $100 billion in exchange for accepting temporary constraints on its nuclear program. The May 19 election will largely serve as a referendum on the nuclear deal and whether to continue down the path of engagement with the West.

Relations with the Supreme Leader

Rouhani's campaign pledges for economic and social reforms were met with resistance from the Supreme Leader and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), both who are loath to relinquish their stranglehold over Iran's politics and economy. Iran's human rights situation deteriorated further under Rouhani's leadership, as executions surged and repression of journalists, dissidents, dual nationals, and minorities intensified.

The 2015 nuclear deal catalyzed strains in Supreme Leader Khamenei's relations with Rouhani. Recognizing the need for sanctions relief, Khamenei warily permitted the deal to go through. However, concerned with attacks from his right flank, Khamenei publicly distanced himself from the deal's merits to maintain his credibility among various factions.

On the economic front, the benefits of sanctions relief accrued primarily to patronage networks linked to Khamenei and the IRGC rather than ordinary Iranians. Iran restored oil exports to pre-sanctions levels and reined in hyperinflation, but lingering structural deficiencies—like corruption, terror financing and money laundering concerns—prevented the boom in trade and investment Iran expected to receive post-JCPOA.

Unwilling to curtail Iran's destabilizing behavior, Khamenei instead sought to shift the blame for economic disappointment to Rouhani, repeatedly criticizing his economic record in recent months. "I feel the pain of the poor and lower class people with my soul, especially because of high prices, unemployment and inequalities. The government has taken positive steps but they do not meet people’s expectations and mine," said Khamenei in his annual Nowruz address on March 20. Khamenei rebuffed Rouhani's opening to the West, calling instead for Iran to dedicate the next year to increasing self-sufficiency and pursuing a so-called "resistance economy" based on ramping up domestic production.  

Relations between Rouhani and the Supreme Leader have sunk even lower during the course of the 2017 electoral season as a result of Rouhani’s surprisingly incendiary campaign rhetoric. Rouhani has framed the election as a choice between a more open and free society, or further repression. He has attacked many of the Islamic Republic’s sacred cows, disparaging the IRGC and the hard-line clerical establishment of which his opponent, Ebrahim Raisi is a prominent member. Most notably, he chastised Raisi’s record of “execution and imprisonment,” a taboo reference to Raisi’s alleged participation in the 1988 execution of thousands of Iranian dissidents.

Rouhani has further crossed the Supreme Leader by challenging the continuing house arrest of 2009 presidential candidates and Green Movement figureheads Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, considered “seditionists” by the ruling establishment. Rouhani’s rallies have featured chants of Mousavi and Karroubi’s names, reopening fissures that the Supreme Leader surely resents. Rouhani’s willingness to flout Iranian political norms indicate that he feels vulnerable to attack on his economic record and failure to advance meaningful social reforms, and must therefore push the envelope to inspire voters.

Electoral Prospects

President Rouhani's surprise electoral victory in 2013 stemmed largely from the inability of the principlist camp — conservatives dedicated to preserving Iran's revolutionary governing system and theocratic, anti-Western ideology at any cost — to coalesce behind a single candidate. Rouhani’s path to the presidency became more difficult following conservative Tehran mayor Mohammed Baqer Qalibaf’s May 15th announcement that he is dropping out of the race and throwing his full support behind Ebrahim Raisi’s hard-line candidacy. On May 17, conservative candidate Mostafa Mirsalim, whose support was negligible, withdrew as well, solidifying the principlists unity in the coming election.

On May 16, reformist candidate and Rouhani’s principal vice president, Eshaq Jahangiri announced his withdrawal in support of Rouhani’s candidacy. Jahangiri served during the campaign as an effective booster, defending the Rouhani administration’s economic policies and the JCPOA against attacks from conservative rivals. The race is now effectively a two-man contest between Rouhani and Raisi.

A May 8 telephone survey by the Iranian Student’s Polling Agency showed Rouhani and Jahangiri capturing 45% of the vote collectively compared to 52% for Raisi and Qalibaf combined. A May 11 survey conducted by International Perspectives on Public Opinion, meanwhile, showed 28% of respondents backing Rouhani compared to 23% for Raisi and Qalibaf collectively, with 28% of voters undecided. Despite Qalibaf’s endorsement of Raisi, it is still likely that many of his more cosmopolitan Tehran supporters will ultimately shift their allegiances to Rouhani.  All indications point toward a far tighter race in 2017 than the 2013 campaign.

Voter turnout will be one of the keys to Rouhani’s success. The nuclear deal has improved Iran’s economic situation at the macro level, but many Iranians remain disillusioned due to lingering high unemployment and increasing costs of living. Principlist candidate Ebrahim Raisi has harshly criticized Rouhani’s economic record and adopted populist campaign promises, pledging to increase cash subsidies to poor Iranians. Rouhani faces a steep uphill challenge to convince alienated voters that his promised social and economic reforms will bear fruit and present a compelling alternative worthy of going to the polls for.

The Iranian regime and the IRGC's intelligence services appear determined to sway the outcome of the election, as they have ramped up monitoring and repression of students, dissidents and journalists in the run-up to the vote. Still, Iranians have tended in recent elections to vote for the most moderate option available to them. Provided that Rouhani can inspire a large turnout, he is likely to be successful in his reelection bid, barring a repeat of 2009's mass vote-rigging or similar efforts to “engineer” the election results.

Photo © AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi