The Pillars of Hezbollah’s War Strategy

In recent weeks, the possibility of an all-out war between Israel and Hezbollah has been the focus of international attention. Until now, diplomatic efforts to prevent the outbreak of war have so far proven fruitless. Accordingly, several countries have already advised their citizens to leave Lebanon due to rising fears that such a war could start soon. 

Western media outlets quoting an unnamed “diplomatic source” foresee that Israel will wait till mid-July, and if no diplomatic breakthrough is reached, it will initiate a ground invasion of Lebanon aimed at pushing Hezbollah away from the international border. It is highly likely that such a development will quickly morph into a full-scale war, as Hezbollah will try to foil the attack and deter Israeli decision-makers from pursuing their military plans by responding forcefully. 

The outlines of Hezbollah’s war strategy will likely include five elements in keeping with its designation as a terror army. As such, the military capabilities Hezbollah holds in Lebanon, which were built over the years thanks to Iranian efforts, resemble those of a conventional military force. 

Hezbollah will engage in defensive guerilla warfare based on the elaborated underground infrastructure the organization has built in southern Lebanon. This infrastructure is located inside and around the Shia villages in south Lebanon and is meant to delay and wear down the advancing Israeli forces. This subterranean sprawling array of tunnels, bunkers, and firing posts will allow Hezbollah to carry out surprise attacks and transfer manpower and weapons without being exposed. A significant example of Hezbollah's underground capabilities was exposed by Israel in 2018 when several cross-border tunnels stretched from Shia villages in Lebanon into Israel’s territory. 

By now, after months of cross-border fire, it seems that Israel has attacked a large part of the above-surface infrastructures inside the Shia villages adjacent to the border. Nevertheless, the damage to Hezbollah's subterranean fortification system is probably more limited, and it should be assumed to be operational and ready to use. 

The second element of Hezbollah's warfare strategy will focus on challenging Israel’s aerial supremacy and preventing the Israeli Air Force from effectively supporting the ground forces. Hezbollah and its Iranian patrons identified Israeli air superiority as one of the organization's main weak points in the 2006 war. Over the years since 2006, multiple reports indicated that Iran has supplied Hezbollah with various kinds of air defense systems, and during the fighting in recent months, Hezbollah has already demonstrated its ability to shoot down Israeli drones over Lebanon. In an all-out war scenario, it is expected that Hezbollah will use its air defense capabilities to target Israeli manned fighter jets as well. 

It is highly likely that alongside the two above-mentioned defensive efforts, Hezbollah will embark on a massive offensive campaign based on its wide range of standoff fire capabilities –  the third pillar of its strategy. These standoff capabilities include various rockets, precision-guided missiles, and attack UAVs reaching an estimated arsenal of 150,000 weapons systems, which vary in range, warhead weight, and accuracy. This array of standoff weapon systems allows the organization to hit any point in Israel and maintain a continuous firepower of thousands of launches a day for weeks. Hezbollah will most likely focus its fire on military assets in the first stage of the conflict and escalate to civilian infrastructures and civilian population centers as the war develops. The use of this massive firepower capability is aimed at neutralizing Israel’s ability to support its military campaign in the first stages and changing the cost-benefit calculations of Israel’s decision-makers while triggering public pressure to stop the fighting, as the war escalates. 

The last element in Hezbollah's war strategy derives from the organization’s basic identity as a terror “resistance group.” Hezbollah will declare “victory” simply by surviving the Israeli superior military force. This is similar to Hamas’s modus operandi in Gaza in the aftermath of the October 7 massacre in Israel. Since it is highly unlikely for Israel to eradicate Hezbollah as an organization, by the end of the war, Hezbollah will claim “victory,” without regard for the damages the organization and the state of Lebanon will suffer. 

Through a combination of defensive ground battles in southern Lebanon, offensive standoff attacks on the Israeli homefront, and calls by Hezbollah’s partners within the Lebanese government for international intervention to stop the Israeli military campaign, Hezbollah will try to prevent Israel from achieving its goals and minimize the damage to its organizational and terror infrastructures. 

The severe destruction and the humanitarian crisis expected in Lebanon due to Hezbollah's use of civilian cover for its military action, in combination with the organization's plans to attack Israeli civilian infrastructures and population centers, will most likely create an urgent international effort to stop the fighting – thus serving Hezbollah’s narrative of “victory” by surviving. 

The above-mentioned catastrophic war scenario is highly likely and should drive all involved parties to maximize their efforts to prevent it from materializing. As things stand today, that is unfortunately not the case, and unless Israel and its allies employ additional means to pressure Hezbollah and its patrons in Tehran to stop the cross-border attacks and withdraw from the international border, Israel could decide that it is left with no choice but to initiate a ground-attack in southern Lebanon. 

Dror Doron is a senior advisor at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) focusing on Hezbollah and Lebanon. He spent nearly two decades as a senior analyst in the Office of Israel’s Prime Minister. Dror is on Twitter @DrorDoron